In recent years, there has been a growing interest in considering the quantitative aspects of Information Flow, partly because often the a priori knowledge of the secret information can be represented by a probability distribution, and partly because the mechanisms to protect the information may use randomization to obfuscate the relation between the secrets and the observables.
the difference between a priori and a posteriori entropy may be negative. This is due to the fact that the notion of entropy uses the probability distribution in two different ways: for averaging and for representing the belief of the attacker. While the leakage should depend on the difference induced by the belief change due to the observation, the averaging probability should remain the same. (A similar concern has also inspired the works of [5] and [7] .) In order to avoid the unnatural consequence of a negative leakage, we propose to base the notion of leakage directly on the (more primitive) notion of mutual information. We consider some cases of entropy, in particular the Rényi's entropies, for which the corresponding notion of mutual information has been investigated in [6] , and we show that in this way the property of non-negativeness is ensured.
